novel indicates that Sillitoe himself has thought through the significance of the conclusion he provides. Can the easy-going and anarchic nihilism of the Seatons be reconciled with a fraternal gesture toward Communist troops, and if so, what is the valuation Sillitoe would have us put upon it? For Seaton does not refuse to shoot the guerillas because they are fellow human-beings; presumably, if they were of another political color, his hand would not tremble at the gun. A humanitarian or ethical justification for his conduct is thus ruled out, while a political one remains unprovided; all that is left, then, is a gratuitous and sentimental gesture.

I am not trying to insinuate that Sillitoe has the "wrong" kind of politics: he probably does not, and in any case, that is not the issue. The point to be made is more important than Sillitoe's opinions: it is that a principled refusal of thought by a novelist will necessarily lead to literary incoherence. And the more's the pity, since Sillitoe is really an original writer. Perhaps someone should whisper in his ear that when you use your mind, you don't use it (or anything else) up.

A Flight that Changed History

by Richard L. Strout

If Gary Powers had stuck himself with his poison needle as the U-2 plane circled helplessly downward over Russia, May 1, 1960, history would have been different. The Summit might have succeeded, Eisenhower would have visited Russia. The plane had been dreamed up as a floppy-winged glider built round a jet engine. It was equipped with a camera that could spot a golf ball on a green at 50,000 feet. It flew right across Russia bringing back so many photographs technicians couldn't process them. Experts figured it could thumb its nose at Soviet defense for maybe four years. They were right, the time limit expired just before the May Summit.

The U-2 Affair
by David Wise and Thomas Ross
(Random House; $4.95)

A Soviet rocket – or something – hit Powers. He didn't use the needle or press the "Destruct" button that would have exploded three pounds of cyclonite. Four days later Khrushchev told Russia he had downed a spy plane; he asked if Eisenhower – his friend of Camp David – knew about it. He implied that the U-2 was demolished and the pilot dead. It was a nice trap and worked beautifully as this book, a brilliant little thriller by two Washington newspapermen, recalls. The reader will not believe till he gets into it how the express-train style will catch him up.

A huddle of Washington officials, which Eisenhower briefly attended, decided that it was safe to issue the prepared "cover" story about poor Powers being shot down on a meteorological flight. That was May 5. On May 7 Mr. K. sprung his trap: he had the plane and the pilot – who was talking. Again he asked, Did Eisenhower know?

Eisenhower was golfing with George Allen at Gettysburg. He did not seem upset by K's second speech. State Department officials swarmed like ants. Herter was back, wrote out and with some difficulty got Eisenhower to approve a new ambiguous statement dropping the cover story but asserting that there was "no authorization" for the Powers flight. The authors say, "For the first time in its 184-year history, the government of the US had conceded publicly that it had deliberately lied, that it had committed espionage, and violated the territory of another country."

Neither the President nor Hagerty, who was with him at Gettysburg, was happy. It was an obsession with Hagerty that the President must appear to be in active control at all times. The Herter statement implied that Eisenhower didn't know what was going on. Overnight, the President reversed his decision. The authors say, "Later, stories went the round in Washington that Hagerty was solely responsible for the President's decision. The press secretary disagreed." In any event, Hagerty rode back to Washington in the same car with President who, next day, publicly took full responsibility for the spy flights.

Now came the most curious phase of all. Without specifically saying so Administration spokesmen repeatedly and deliberately left the impression that U-2 flights would continue. Eisenhower went off to Paris apparently feeling that he could negotiate with a country whose sovereignty, in Lippmann's phrase, he would continue to threaten. The authors explain it simply:

> "As the Paris Summit approached, Eisenhower's temper began to flare behind the scenes. To his intimates at the White House he said, in effect, 'We're not going to have any more of those damn flights, but we won't say so'."

If the explanation above is correct it recalls Aaron Wildavsky's study of "Dixon-Yates" (Yale University Press; 1962) where the angry President refused to admit at press conferences anything improper in Adolphe Wenzell's role, even after its disclosure.

How about Gary Powers? He was a master-pilot, had courage to fly the U-2, loved his family and just didn't see the sense of dying. At the trial in Moscow he regretted that he had done his country "a very bad service" and saw the error of his ways. Is he a symbol of something or other? He was shortly swapped for the Soviet master-spy Rudolf Abell (who made no admission of regret!) and appeared before a Senate committee, which conspicuously avoided any searching questions. He drew all his back pay.

In the melodrama of the Summit, Eisenhower behaved with dignity and Khrushchev like a boor; unfortunately K had all the good lines. "Like a swimmer caught in a pounding surf," say the authors, "Washington had been unable to rally from each succeeding wave before a new one came smashing down."

The Presidential campaign was starting. Back in New York on a TV show the unfortunate Nixon prematurely argued that U-2 flights were necessary and should continue. Adlai Stevenson and Kennedy were savagely denounced for hinting that somebody had bungled. When Eisenhower returned to Wash-